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     Abstract  
 
We provide a comprehensive assessment of the effects of new 
imported inputs on wage dynamics, on the skill-composition of the 
labor force, on worker mobility, and on the efficiency of matching 
between firms and workers. We employ matched employer-
employee data for Italy, over 1995-2007. We complement these 
data with information on the arrival of new imported inputs at the 
industry level. We find new imported inputs to have a positive 
effect on average wage growth at the firm level. This effect is 
driven by two factors: (1) an increase in the white-collar/blue-
collar ratio; and (2) an increase in the average wage growth of 
blue-collar workers, while the wage growth of white collars is not 
significantly affected. The individual-level analysis reveals that the 
increase in the average wage of blue collars is driven by the 
displacement of the lowest paid workers, while continuously 
employed individuals are not affected. We estimate the 
unobserved skills of workers following Abowd et al. (1999). We 
find evidence that new imported inputs lead to a positive selection 
of higher-skilled workers, and to an improvement in positive 
assortative matching between firms and workers. 
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1 Introduction
The most recent globalization wave has been characterized by an upsurge of trade in in-
termediate inputs (Feenstra, 1998; Feenstra and Hanson, 1999; Yi, 2003). This has been
associated with a sizable increase in the number of new imported intermediates world-
wide (Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Goldberg et al., 2009; Colantone and Crino`, 2014). A
large literature has focused on the effects of foreign input sourcing. In particular, sev-
eral studies have shown that imported inputs lead to productivity gains (Amiti and Kon-
ings, 2007, Halpern et al., 2015, Topalova and Khandelwal, 2011 and Yu, 2015); foster
the introduction of new domestic products (Goldberg et al., 2010, and Colantone and
Crino`, 2014); and improve export performance (Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2014, and Bas
and Strauss-Kahn, 2015). Much less attention has been paid to the effects of imported
inputs on wages. In particular, only two studies, by Amiti and Davis (2011) and Chen
et al. (2017), have found positive effects of lower input tariffs on, respectively, importing
firms’ wages in Indonesia, and firm-level skill premia in China.
In this paper, we employ a direct measure of the arrival of new imported inputs in
Italy, at the industry level, and we provide the first comprehensive assessment of the
effects of new imported inputs on wage dynamics, on the skill-composition of the labor
force, on worker mobility, and on the efficiency of matching between firms and workers.
We use unique matched employer-employee data on the Italian manufacturing sec-
tor, sourced from the Italian Social Security Institute (INPS). We combine these data with
information on the arrival of new imported inputs at the industry level, over the time-
span 1995-2007. New imported inputs are identified based on disaggregated import data
sourced from Eurostat. We find new imported inputs to have a positive impact on av-
erage wage growth at the firm level. This effect is driven by two factors: (1) an increase
in the white-collar/blue-collar ratio; and (2) an increase in the average wage growth of
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blue-collar workers, while the wage growth of white collars is not significantly affected.
The individual-level analysis reveals that the increase in the average wage of blue col-
lars is driven by the displacement of the lowest paid workers. We instead find no im-
pact of new imported inputs on the wages of continuously employed individuals, both
for blue-collar and for white-collar workers. To further characterize the underlying ad-
justment process, we estimate the unobserved skills of workers following Abowd et al.
(1999). We find evidence that new imported inputs lead to a positive selection of higher-
skilled workers, and to an improvement in positive assortative matching between firms
and workers.
Overall, our findings depict a picture of industry transformation driven by global
sourcing opportunities. The arrival of new imported inputs determines a change in the
composition of the workforce, with relatively more white collars employed in manufac-
turing firms, and a selection of the higher-wage and higher-skilled blue collars. In addi-
tion, there is a gain in terms of allocative efficiency, as the quality of matching between
firms and workers improves. Our evidence is in line with earlier results on the positive
effects of new imported inputs on domestic product innovation and export performance
at the industry level (e.g., Colantone and Crino`, 2014 and Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2014).
In particular, we provide evidence that the effects we identify are stronger in industries
characterized by higher product innovation rates and higher export intensity over the
sample. These types of industry dynamics are indeed particularly consistent with the
upgrade in the workforce uncovered by our analysis. Moreover, we also show that new
imported imports have distinctive implications as compared to more general measures
of offshoring.
For identifying new imported inputs, we rely on import data from the COMEXT database
released by Eurostat. This provides information on yearly import flows for the universe
of products –and from the universe of trading partners– at the highest possible level of
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disaggregation (8 digits). As in Colantone and Crino` (2014), new imported inputs are de-
fined as new imported varieties, where a variety is a combination of a product-code and
a partner-country. That is, we identify the first time in which a given input is imported
in Italy from any country. Our identification procedure deals with the complications
raised by changes in the classification of products over time, through the use of appro-
priate correspondence tables provided by Eurostat. Moreover, the entry of new inputs is
not affected by discontinuities in imports, as any re-entry of a given variety after one or
more years of break is not considered in our count of entries.
Our main variable of interest is the overall arrival rate of new imported inputs at the
2-digit NACE (Rev 1.1) industry level. For each given industry, this comprehensive mea-
sure includes new inputs that are imported not only within the industry itself, but also
in other industries which are related through vertical linkages. To capture these link-
ages, we use information from the Eurostat Import Matrices, which reflect the weight
of each industry in the total imports of intermediates of any other industry. Our overall
entry rate of new imported inputs has an average value of about 11%, with a standard
deviation of 3.2%. It ranges from a minumum of 4% to a maximum of 20%.
We address endogeneity concerns related to the arrival of new imported inputs in
Italy using as instrument the arrival of new imported inputs in 24 other countries of the
European Union, over the same period. To construct the instrumental variable, we first
identify new imported inputs separately in each country, and then compute a country-
industry specific entry rate for each year, exactly as done for Italy. Finally, we compute
the average entry rate of new imported inputs across the 24 countries, for each indus-
try and year. Inspired by earlier studies in the empirical trade literature (Autor et al.,
2013; Dauth et al., 2014; Hummels et al., 2014; Bloom et al., 2016; Colantone et al., 2015),
this instrument is meant to capture the variation in the arrival of new imported inputs
that is driven by changes in supply conditions in foreign countries, and not by domes-
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tic industry-specific shocks in Italy, which might be endogenous to wage growth and
worker mobility. Our results are robust to a large number of robustness checks on the
IV-strategy, including controls for industry-specific contemporaneous shocks and un-
derlying trends.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the related
literature. In Section 3 we discuss the identification of new imported inputs, as well as
the related endogeneity concerns, and the instrumental variable employed in the econo-
metric analysis. In Section 4 we present the matched employer-employee data. In Sec-
tion 5 we describe the firm-level results, while the worker-level evidence is presented in
Section 6. Section 7 contains results on worker selection and positive assortative match-
ing. Section 8 provides a comprehensive discussion of the results, along with suggestive
evidence on the possible channels. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2 Related literature
This paper is related to different strands of empirical studies. In particular, as men-
tioned in the introduction, our work speaks to the literature investigating the effects of
imported inputs in the domestic economy. Starting from the seminal paper by Amiti
and Konings (2007), which provided the first evidence of a causal link between reduced
input tariffs and firm-level productivity growth in Indonesia, several studies have found
consistent results in a number of different settings. In particular, Halpern et al., 2015,
Topalova and Khandelwal (2011), and Yu (2015) have shown evidence of productivity
gains stemming from lower input tariffs in Hungary, India, and China, respectively.
Other empirical studies have investigated the relation between imported inputs and
product innovation. Specifically, Goldberg et al. (2010) show that lower input tariffs lead
to an expansion of the produced product bundle at Indian firms, while Colantone and
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Crino` (2014) identify a positive effect of new imported inputs on the introduction of new
domestic products at the country level, focusing on 25 countries of the European Union.
Bas and Strauss-Khan (2014, 2015) have investigated the relation between imported in-
puts and export performance. In particular, Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2014) detect a posi-
tive effect of imported inputs on the number of varieties exported by French firms, while
Bas and Strauss-Kahn (2015) provide evidence of a positive link between reduced input
tariffs, upgraded imported inputs, and an upgrade in the quality of exported products
by Chinese firms.
Our paper is most closely related to Amiti and Davis (2011), who have provided the
first evidence of a positive effect of reduced input tariffs on the wages paid by import-
ing firms. In particular, they develop a theoretical model with heterogeneous firms and
fair wages, where the profit gains stemming from improved access to foreign inputs are
shared with workers at firms that use imported inputs. Empirical support for this the-
oretical result is found using firm-level data from Indonesia, encompassing the trade
liberalization of the 90s. A more recent paper by Chen et al. (2017) finds a positive ef-
fect of lower input tariffs on the skill premia paid by Chinese firms. Such an effect is
stronger for ordinary firms than for processing importers, and grows with the share of
skilled workers within the firm.
We contribute to this literature by focusing on a direct measure of new imported in-
puts in a developed economy such as Italy, and by using matched employer-employee
data to provide the first comprehensive assessment of the effects of new imported in-
puts on wage dynamics, on the skill-composition of the labor force, on worker mobility,
and on the efficiency of matching between firms and workers.
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3 New imported inputs
For the identification of new imported inputs, we proceed as in Colantone and Crino`
(2014). We start from the Eurostat COMEXT database, which provides information on
the value and volume of imports for the universe of manufacturing products, and from
all trading partners in the world (i.e., about 200 countries). Data are provided at the dis-
aggregated 8-digit level of the Combined Nomenclature (CN) classification, which con-
tains more than 10,000 codes. This classification is linked to the NACE Rev 1.1. indus-
try classification through appropriate correspondence tables provided by Eurostat. Our
main variables of interest are computed at the NACE 2-digit industry level. Specifically,
we employ import data on Italy to construct the main explanatory variable capturing
the arrival of new imported inputs. Based on the same database, we also perform the
identification of new imported inputs for 24 additional EU countries in order to com-
pute our instrumental variables.1 Detailed information on the time coverage by country
is provided in Table A1 of Appendix A. For Italy, trade data span the period 1988-2007.
In order to identify intermediate inputs out of the whole set of imported products,
we map the CN classification into the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification.
We then define as inputs all the CN codes that belong to the following BEC categories:
“parts and accessories” (BEC 42); “capital goods, except transport equipment” (BEC 41);
“processed industrial supplies” (BEC 22); “industrial transport equipment” (BEC 521);
“parts and accessories of transport equipment” (BEC 53); “processed fuels and lubri-
cants” (BEC 32); “processed food and beverages for industry” (BEC 121). As also dis-
cussed by Colantone and Crino` (2014), this is a standard way of defining inputs, both in
the empirical trade literature and in the computation of aggregate trade statistics (e.g.,
by Eurostat, OECD, and the United Nations). In the results section, we nevertheless as-
1Data for Belgium and Luxembourg are aggregated by Eurostat, so the two countries constitute a single
unit of analysis.
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sess the robustness of our main findings to adopting narrower definitions of inputs, ex-
cluding capital goods, fuels, and lubricants.
In our analysis, we treat each imported variety of inputs as a different input. A variety
is defined as a product (h) - partner (n) combination. This approach is standard in the
empirical trade literature (see, e.g., Broda and Weinstein, 2006; Goldberg et al., 2009;
Goldberg et al., 2010; Colantone and Crino`, 2014). We then identify new imported inputs
in terms of new imported varieties. Specifically, we define variety (v) as a new imported
input when product (h) is imported from partner (n) for the first time.
The identification of new imported varieties is all but trivial, due to changes that oc-
cur on a yearly basis in the Combined Nomenclature classification. These changes can
be of two types: (1) new products are added to the classification with corresponding
new codes; or (2) some of the existing (old) product codes are converted into new prod-
uct codes. The second type of changes are problematic for our purposes, as they reflect
renaming of products rather than the entry of new products in the set of imports.
We keep track of all changes in the CN classification using year-to-year correspon-
dence tables provided by Eurostat. We then identify variety v, imported into country c
in year t, as new if either: (1) code h is introduced in the classification in year t and does
not have any old code corresponding to it; or (2) code h is introduced in the classifica-
tion in year t and has one or more old codes corresponding to it, but none of them was
imported into country c from partner n in any previous year; or (3) code h is not new to
the classification, but was not imported into country c from partner n in any previous
year.2 With this identification procedure, a variety can be counted as new only once. If
a country stops importing a given variety in one year, and then resumes imports at any
2The Stata code that identifies new imported inputs works as follows. Consider input variety v, which
is made up of code h, imported by country c from partner n in year t, but not in previous years. The pro-
gram first checks for the existence of old codes corresponding to h. If there is none, variety v is directly
identified as a new imported input. If instead one or more old codes exist, the program verifies that coun-
try c was not importing any of the old codes from partner n in all previous years. Only in that case variety
v is identified as a new imported input. This routine runs in approximately two days for each EU country.
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later stage, such a re-entry is not considered as an entry for our purposes. Overall, the
identification of new imported inputs in our analysis is not affected by changes in the
CN classification, nor by discontinuities in bilateral trade flows over time.
Our measure of new imported inputs includes both product codes that are imported
for the very first time from any partner country, and new varieties of product codes
that were already imported from one or more partner countries, and start being im-
ported from an additional trading partner. This comprehensive approach is meant to
capture all the potential effects stemming from different characteristics of the new im-
ported varieties as compared to the old varieties, even for the same product code. For
instance, Colantone and Crino` (2014) have shown that improvements in price-quality
ratios brought about by new imported varieties have positive implications for product
innovation. Nevertheless, we also probe the robustness of our main findings to using
a narrower definition of new imported inputs, which only considers the very first time
that a given input code is imported from any partner country.
3.1 Measurement
To build up the industry-specific indicator for the arrival of new imported inputs, we
start from the following measure:
NIIjt = (new imported inputs)jt/(total imported inputs)jt, (1)
where j indexes 2-digit NACE Rev 1.1 industries, and t years.
NIIjt is the ratio between new varieties of imported inputs and the total number of
input varieties imported in each 2-digit industry. Its computation is based on the map-
ping of each 8-digit CN product code into a NACE industry. This measure captures the
arrival of new imported inputs within each industry. Thus, it is an horizontal indicator
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for input entry. Yet, as a matter of fact, firms within each industry source their inter-
mediates also from other industries, which creates vertical linkages. Hence, to capture
more comprehensively the entry of new imported inputs which are relevant for the firms
belonging to each industry, we compute the following indicator:
NIIovjt =
∑
k
φjk ·NIIkt. (2)
NIIovjt is an overall indicator for the arrival of new imported inputs that are relevant
for firms in industry j. It is computed as a weighted average of the horizontal indicator
of input entry in each 2-digit industry k, including j itself. Each industry gets a weight
φjk which reflects the share of industry k out of the total value of intermediates that
industry j is importing from abroad. This information is obtained from Eurostat Import
Matrices, which are available at the NACE 2-digit level of disaggregation. In particular,
we compute the share of each industry for all the available years, and then compute φjk
as the average of the yearly figures (see Table A1 of Appendix A for full information).
NIIovjt has an average value of about 11%, with a standard deviation of 3.2%. It
ranges from a minumum of 4% to a maximum of 20%. These figures refer to the pe-
riod 1995-2007, which is the time span of the econometric analysis employing firm and
worker-level data. Yet, it is important to stress how new imported inputs are always
identified based on import data that go back to 1988. For instance, when we identify
an input variety as new in 1995, we know that this was not imported in any previous
year until 1988, which is the first year with available information. This corroborates the
robustness of our analysis.
In the empirical section, we show that our main findings are robust to computing φjk
using import weights from the first available year, or industry shares that are based on
domestic Input-Output coefficients rather than import-specific figures. Finally, we also
show results using the horizontal indicator for the arrival of new imported inputs,NIIjt,
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instead of the overall one, NIIovjt. When we do that, all the findings are qualitatively
unaffected, but the magnitudes of the effects are somewhat smaller, in line with the idea
that the horizontal indicator does not capture the full spectrum of relevant imported
inputs.
3.2 Endogeneity
Our main goal is investigating the impact of new imported inputs on wages and worker
mobility. To this purpose we estimate, for instance, regressions of wage growth –at the
firm or worker level– against the lagged overall arrival of new imported inputs in the cor-
responding industry: NIIovj . Similar regressions are run with the individual probability
of job separation as a dependent variable. Alternatively, the dependent variables can
be industry-level measures of unobserved worker skills, as well as proxies for positive
assortative matching between firms and workers within each industry.
A concern with our analysis is the possible endogeneity of the arrival of new imported
inputs. Endogeneity might stem from two different sources. First, there could be an
issue of reverse causality. For instance, an increase in domestic wages in Italy could push
firms to start sourcing more new inputs from abroad, to improve the price-quality ratio
of intermediates. This would lead to an upward bias in the OLS estimates of the NIIovjt
coefficient. Second, there could be an omitted variables issue. This could be driven
by unobserved shocks inducing a correlation between changes in wages and variations
in new imported inputs, conditional on other controls. For instance, negative supply
shocks in Italy may have a negative impact on wages and simultaneously lead to more
new imported inputs, as domestic suppliers become less productive and competitive.
This would induce a downward bias in the OLS estimates.
These concerns are mitigated by the fact that our specifications always control for
year dummies, and either firm or worker-firm fixed effects, depending on the specific
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regression. Moreover, we also include several time-varying controls for worker, firm,
and industry characteristics (see infra). In addition, we run instrumental variable re-
gressions. In particular, we instrument the overall arrival of new imported inputs in in-
dustry j and year t in Italy (NIIovjt) using the average corresponding industry-specific
indicator computed in the same year across the remaining 24 EU countries in our sam-
ple. This instrument is meant to isolate variation in new imported inputs in Italy which
is due to exogenous changes in supply conditions in the origin countries, and not to do-
mestic specific shocks which might be endogenous to wages and worker mobility. This
IV approach is similar in spirit to the one originally proposed by Autor et al. (2013) for
instrumenting US imports from China, and has been employed in several other stud-
ies (e.g., Dauth et al., 2014; Hummels et al., 2014; Bloom et al., 2016; Colantone et al.,
2015). In the empirical section, we discuss possible concerns with the exclusion restric-
tion underlying our IV strategy, and we present a large number of robustness checks
corroborating our main findings.
4 Matched employer-employee data
We use a matched employer-employee database released by the Italian Social Security
Institute (INPS). This includes a random sample of 185,544 manufacturing workers, for
whom we can track the employment history between 1995 and 2007. The sample in-
cludes all workers born on day 1 or 9 of any month in any year. For each individual, we
have information on age, gender, yearly wage, occupation (blue collar vs. white collar),
type of contract (part-time vs. full-time), number of weeks worked (full-time equiva-
lent), and firm of employment in each year.3
3In our sample, each worker has one observation per year, corresponding to one worker-firm contract.
In the original administrative data, there are a few cases in which the same employee displays more than
one contract in the same year, with different firms. In those cases, we focus on the worker-firm observa-
tion recording the highest yearly wage.
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Overall, our sample includes 66,578 firms with at least one sampled worker employed
in any year. For each of these firms, we have information on firm age and the total num-
ber of employees, as well as the number of white collars and blue collars on yearly basis,
along with their average wages. Importantly, all the firm-level data refer to the whole
workforce of each firm, and not just to the restricted number of workers that are ran-
domly included in the INPS sample. In other words: (1) for each sampled worker we
have complete worker-level information; (2) for each firm in which at least one sampled
worker is employed, we have firm-level information referring to the universe of employ-
ees. Finally, for each firm we know the industry of affiliation, at the NACE (Rev 1.1) 2-
digit level of disaggregation. This allows us to attribute to each firm its industry-specific
arrival of new imported inputs in each year.
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics on the sample of workers. Age ranges be-
tween 15 and 64, with an average of 39.7. The mean tenure within the firm is equal to
about 4.8, with a maximum of 13. The average real weakly wage is equal to 460.43 euros.4
Nominal wages are deflated using the FOI index published by the Italian National Insti-
tute for Statistics (ISTAT). FOI is a consumption price index computed specifically for
employees’ families. The base year is 2007. The average wage is higher for white-collar
than blue-collar workers: 573.74 vs. 415.66. The average wage growth over two years,
which is our main variable of interest, is equal to 3.6% over the full sample of workers. It
is higher for white collars (5.3%) than for blue collars (3%).5
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics on the firm-level variables. Firm age ranges
between 0 and 89, with an average of about 17. The average total number of employees
is equal to 54.86.6 The average share of white collars out of total workers is equal to 26%,
4In all our analysis, the weakly wages of part-time workers are made fully comparable with respect to
the weakly wages of full-time workers. This is done by dividing the overall yearly wage by the number of
full-time-equivalent weeks worked.
5As in Macis and Schivardi (2016), we have dropped records in the first and last percentiles of the wage
distributions.
6The total number of employees has a minimum of zero. This refers to single entrepreneurs working
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and its average growth over two years is equal to 0.8%. The mean growth of average firm-
level wages is equal to 2.1% over two years. Consistent with the worker-level data, wage
growth is higher for white collars (2.9%) than for blue collars (1.6%).
Table 1: Worker-level data: descriptives
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 39.70 9.53 15 64
Tenure 4.78 3.16 1 13
Real average weekly wage: all 460.43 171.07 13.84 3401.45
Real average weekly wage: blue collars 415.66 112.98 13.84 3382.40
Real average weekly wage: white collars 573.74 223.28 17.46 3401.45
2-years growth of real wage: all 0.036 0.118 -0.565 0.616
2-years growth of real wage: blue collars 0.030 0.116 -0.565 0.616
2-years growth of real wage: white collars 0.053 0.122 -0.565 0.616
Table 2: Firm-level data: descriptives
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 16.68 10.52 0 89
Size (total number of employees) 54.86 314.19 0 72199
Share of white collars 0.26 0.18 0 1
2-years growth of share of white collars 0.008 0.053 -0.200 0.246
2-years growth of real annual wage: all 0.021 0.072 -0.248 0.275
2-years growth of real annual wage: blue collars 0.016 0.079 -0.363 0.346
2-years growth of real annual wage: white collars 0.029 0.138 -0.546 0.606
5 Firm-level evidence
5.1 Econometric specification
At the firm level, we estimate specifications of the following form:
Firm Outcomezjt = αz + αt + β1NIIovjt−2 + Fzt−2γ
′
+ Sjt−2λ
′
+ εzjt, (3)
where z indexes firms, j industries, and t years.
Depending on the regression, FirmOutcomezjt is, alternatively, the firm-level growth
of: average wage; share of white collars out of total workers; average white collars wage;
at firms with no additional employees.
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and average blue collars wage. All variables are measured at the firm (z) level, between
year t and t − 2. αz and αt are firm and year fixed effects, respectively. NIIovjt−2 is the
overall arrival rate of new imported inputs in industry j in year t − 2. This variable is
computed according to equation 2, taking into account vertical linkages across NACE
2-digit industries.7
Fzt−2 is a vector of controls for firm characteristics in year t − 2. It includes firm age
and the logarithm of firm size, measured as the total number of employees.
Sjt−2 is a vector of industry-level controls in year t − 2. It includes five variables: (1)
labor productivity, measured as value added per worker (in logs); (2) capital intensity,
proxied by capital compensation per worker (in logs); (3) material intensity, proxied by
materials expenditure per worker (in logs); (4) export intensity, measured as exports over
output; and (5) import intensity, measured as imports over output. These controls are
meant to account for cross-industry differences at the moment in which new imported
inputs arrive. Data on labor productivity, capital, and material intensity are from the
World Input-Output Database (WIOD, Timmer et al., 2015). Export and import inten-
sity are constructed from Eurostat data; specifically, trade data are from COMEXT, while
output data are sourced from Structural Business Statistics.
To summarize, our identification strategy consists of comparing changes in firm per-
formance across initially similar firms, operating in initially similar industries, except for
the arrival of new imported inputs.
5.2 Baseline results
Table 3 reports the baseline results at the firm level. The table has 12 columns, referring
to three different groups of regressions. Specifically, in columns 1-4 we run OLS estima-
7We obtain very similar results if we employ the third or fourth lag of NIIov, changing the rest of the
specification accordingly, e.g., computing wage growth between year t and t − 3, or between year t and
t− 4. These results are available upon request.
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tions of equation 3, including firm and year fixed effects, but excluding the two vectors
of firm and industry controls (Fzt−2 and Sit−2). In columns 5-8, we estimate the same
specification, but instrumentingNIIovjt−2 using the arrival rate of new imported inputs
in other EU countries. Finally, in columns 9-12 we add firm and industry controls to the
IV regressions. In all cases, standard errors are clustered at the industry level, to account
for possible correlation of errors across observations within industries.
For each group of regressions, the dependent variable in the first column is the growth
of average wages at the firm level. This is followed by the growth in the share of white-
collar workers out of total firm employment (second column); the growth of average
wage for white collars within the firm (third column); and the growth of average wage
for blue collars within the firm (fourth column). All these variables are measured be-
tween year t and t − 2, that is, over two years after the arrival of new imported inputs in
year t− 2.
Across the board, results in Table 3 suggest that new imported inputs lead to higher
growth of firm-level average wages. Such growth is driven by two factors: (1) an increase
in the share of white collars out of total workers; and (2) an increase in the average wage
of blue collars. Conversely, the average wage of white collar workers does not seem to
be affected. Such findings are very similar across the three groups of regressions. In
particular, OLS and IV estimates of the NIIov coefficient are very close to each other,
pointing to the absence of a clear endogeneity bias in any direction. This is consistent
with our earlier discussion on the possible sources of endogeneity, which could bias OLS
estimates both upwards and downwards, thus potentially compensating each other. In
line with the expectations, the first-stage coefficient of the instrument is always positive
and statistically significant. Moreover, the F-statistic is comfortably high, reassuring on
the strength of the instrument.
In terms of magnitudes, the NIIov coefficient in the baseline IV specification of col-
16
umn 9 indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase in the share of new imported
inputs (i.e., by 3.2 percentage points) leads to an increase in the overall average wage
growth by around 0.4%. This is far from negligible, considering that the average 2-year
wage growth at the firm level is equal to 2%, with a standard deviation of 7.2%. A similar
result is obtained in column 12 with respect to the growth of blue-collar average wages,
whose 2-year growth is equal on average to 1.6% (std. dev. of 7.9%). Finally, according to
column 10, the same one-standard-deviation increase in NIIov leads to an increase in
the growth of the white-collar share by 0.13%, which is equal to almost 16% of its average
2-year growth rate: 0.82%. By and large, the effects of new imported inputs appear to be
not only statistically significant, but also economically meaningful.
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5.3 Robustness and sensitivity
In Tables 4-8, we submit our baseline results to a large number of robustness and sen-
sitivity checks. All the reported results refer to IV estimations including firm and year
fixed effects, as well as firm and industry-level controls, as in columns 9-12 of Table 3.
In panel (1), instead of usingNIIov, we include as an explanatory variable the second
lag ofNIIj, which is the share of new imported input varieties out of the total number of
imported varieties within industry j only, as defined in equation 1. Compared to NIIov,
this variable thus excludes new imported varieties in other industries that supply inputs
to industry j. The instrument is also computed accordingly. Results are in line with the
baseline evidence of Table 3. If anything, the coefficients are somewhat smaller. This is
consistent with the idea that firms in any industry source intermediates also from other
industries; hence, the arrival of new imported inputs in related industries matters as
well. Our baseline measure, NIIov, is meant to take into account all the new imported
inputs that might be relevant.
In panel (2), we include in the specification the share of new domestic inputs. This
variable is computed in two steps as in Colantone and Crino` (2014), based on Eurostat
PRODCOM data. First, we identify all the new 8-digit products that start to be produced
in each industry and year, and compute their ratio over the total number of products.8
Second, we compute an overall measure of the entry of new domestic inputs by taking
the weighted average of industry-specific entry rates as in equation 2, using year-specific
weights from the domestic Input-Output matrices. The baseline results on NIIov are
unaffected, while we do not find any significant association between our firm-level out-
comes and the entry of new domestic inputs. This evidence lines with earlier findings in
the literature, where several studies have shown that imported inputs do have specific
8See Colantone and Crino` (2014) for a complete explanation of the identification of new domestic
products.
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implications that distinguish them from domestic inputs (e.g., Amiti and Konings, 2007;
Colantone and Crino`, 2014).
A possible concern with our analysis is that international trade might have an impact
on wages not only through the arrival of new imported inputs, but also through other
factors. Our baseline specifications always control for both import and export intensity.
On top of that, in panels (3) to (6) we investigate the robustness of our results to the
inclusion of additional variables related to trade. Specifically, in panel (3) we include
the share of new out of total imported varieties of final goods within each industry. The
inclusion of this variable leaves our main findings unchanged. If anything, we find some
evidence of a negative correlation between new imported final goods and wages. This is
consistent with the presence of competition effects induced by imports of final goods,
which might reduce wage growth at domestic firms (see, e.g. Autor et al., 2013).
Next, one could wonder whether our measure of new imported inputs is just picking
up the role of offshoring more in general. To account for that, in panels (4)-(6) we include
in the regressions three measures that are meant to capture offshoring in more general
terms. In particular, in panel (4) we include the (log) value of imported inputs within
the industry. In panel (5) we include the share of inputs out of total imports within the
industry; while in panel (6) we introduce an overall value of such ratio across related in-
dustries, computed through Input-Output weights as done forNIIov in equation 2. Our
results on the role of new imported inputs are robust in all regressions. The coefficients
of the new variables are always negative, and often significant, in line with a negative
impact of offshoring on wages. Overall, this evidence suggests the new imported inputs
might have very different implications than general offshoring.
Finally, in panels (7)-(9) we investigate whether the source of new imported inputs
matters. Specifically, in panel (7) we reconstruct NIIov focusing only on imported in-
20
put varieties from the set of 52 low-income countries identified by Bernard et al. (2006).9
In panel (8) we focus on all other trading partners of Italy, while in panel (9) we restrict
to OECD countries only. The instruments are changed accordingly. Our results are ro-
bust across the board. In panels (7) and (9) we even find weak evidence of a positive
effect on the average white-collar wage. These results suggest that new imported inputs
might generate similar effects on wages regardless of their different sources. Even the
magnitudes of the effects are very similar across panels if one takes into account the dif-
ferences in standard deviations among the three versions of NIIov.10 This evidence is
in line with earlier theoretical findings by Colantone and Crino` (2014), who have high-
lighted two possible channels through which new imported inputs may work: (1) by
expanding the set of available intermediates for domestic producers; and (2) by allow-
ing access to better varieties of inputs in terms of price-quality ratios. Such effects might
arise both as firms source cheaper inputs from low-income countries, and as they start
sourcing more sophisticated inputs at better conditions from new suppliers in richer
industrialized countries.
In Table 5 we focus on alternative measures of new imported inputs. We start by
assessing the robustness of our results to changing the Input-Output weights that are
employed in the computation of NIIov, as outlined in equation 2. Specifically, in panel
(1) we use weights obtained from the import matrix in the first available year, rather
than the average import weights across years used in the baseline measure of NIIov.
The advantage of using first-year weights is that of capturing the structure of backward
linkages at the beginning of the sample, although this measure might clearly be more
noisy as compared to the baseline. In panel (2) we use year-specific weights obtained
9These countries are identified as having a level of GDP per capita lower than 5% of the US figure. The
full list is available in Table A2 of Appendix A.
10In particular, NIIov from low-income countries has an average of 1.1%, with a standard deviation of
0.26%. For other countries the average is 9.9%, with standard deviation of 2.85%. For OECD countries the
average is 5.2%, with standard deviation of 2.16%.
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Table 4: Robustness checks: additional variables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ∆ wage ∆ share ∆ wage ∆ wage
All WC WC BC
1) Only new imported inputs within the same industry
NIIj 0.083*** 0.021*** 0.041 0.079***
[0.020] [0.007] [0.027] [0.025]
Obs. 415,371 415,371 415,371 415,371
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
2) Including new domestic inputs
NIIov 0.124*** 0.038*** 0.051 0.129***
[0.031] [0.010] [0.033] [0.038]
Share of new domestic inputs 0.075 0.006 -0.017 0.071
[0.083] [0.014] [0.055] [0.093]
Obs. 376,666 376,666 376,666 376,666
R2 0.029 0.005 0.007 0.027
3) Including new imported final goods
NIIov 0.139*** 0.042*** 0.056 0.147***
[0.030] [0.007] [0.035] [0.038]
Share of new imported final goods -0.088** -0.002 -0.032 -0.117***
[0.038] [0.010] [0.030] [0.043]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
4) Including overall value of imported inputs
NIIov 0.101*** 0.039*** 0.034 0.105***
[0.030] [0.007] [0.033] [0.038]
ln(value of all imported inputs) -0.020** -0.002 -0.014** -0.019**
[0.008] [0.002] [0.006] [0.009]
Obs. 415,371 415,371 415,371 415,371
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.027
5) Controlling for share of inputs out of total imports
NIIov 0.084** 0.032*** 0.025 0.086*
[0.035] [0.009] [0.038] [0.045]
Share of inputs over total imports: same industry -0.062 -0.015 -0.039 -0.065
[0.043] [0.011] [0.030] [0.046]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
6) Controlling for share of inputs out of total imports
NIIov 0.084** 0.033*** 0.028 0.090**
[0.034] [0.008] [0.038] [0.044]
Share of inputs over total imports: overall -0.132** -0.028 -0.073** -0.122
[0.063] [0.018] [0.037] [0.075]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.027
7) Focus on inputs from low-income countries
NIIov from low-income countries 1.532*** 0.301** 0.461* 1.538***
[0.258] [0.118] [0.278] [0.301]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.028 0.004 0.008 0.026
8) Focus on inputs from all other countries
NIIov from all other countries 0.140*** 0.048*** 0.064 0.143***
[0.038] [0.008] [0.040] [0.046]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
9) Focus on inputs from OECD countries
NIIov from OECD countries 0.256*** 0.085*** 0.129* 0.263**
[0.093] [0.022] [0.078] [0.107]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
Standard errors are corrected for clustering within industries.
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.22
from Use Matrices, which are informative of input-output linkages based on domestic
transactions only. In panel (3) we instead use the average values of these weights over
all years. Our results remain very stable across the three panels, in terms of size and
significance.
One could wonder that our baseline measure of new imported inputs is noisy, as in-
put varieties might exit shortly after their entry. To rule out that our results are driven by
such short-run volatility of imports, in panel (4) we reconstruct NIIov by including as
new imported inputs only those varieties that keep being imported until the end of the
sample after having entered in one year. All our baseline results are confirmed, and we
also find evidence of a significant positive effect on the average wage of white collars. To
further account for the churning of imported inputs, in panel (5) we include as an ex-
planatory variable the net entry of imported input varieties. Finally, in panel (6), instead
of considering all the new imported varieties (i.e., combinations of input codes and trad-
ing partners), when computingNIIov we focus only on the very first imported variety of
any input. None of these robustness checks alters our main results. Notably, when con-
sidering only the first varieties, the coefficients are somewhat smaller. This is suggestive
of the importance of considering also new varieties of previously imported inputs, as
changes in the source countries might entail relevant changes in input characteristics
such as quality and prices, which do have implications on firm-level adjustments.
As a final robustness check on the computation of NIIov, in panel (7) we exclude
capital goods, while in panel (8) we also exclude fuels and lubricants. Results are largely
unaffected also in this case. If anything, we detect again some weak evidence of a posi-
tive effect of new imported inputs on the average wage of white collars.
In Table 6 we perform robustness checks related to the instrumental variable. The
exclusion restriction behind our identification strategy is that, conditional on other co-
variates, the arrival of new imported inputs in other European countries is orthogonal to
23
Table 5: Robustness checks: alternative measures
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ∆ wage ∆ share ∆ wage ∆ wage
All WC WC BC
1) Weights from first available Import Matrix
NIIov 0.138*** 0.045*** 0.058* 0.140***
[0.034] [0.008] [0.035] [0.041]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
2) Weights from Use Matrices (year-specific)
NIIov 0.155*** 0.044*** 0.060 0.163***
[0.035] [0.007] [0.037] [0.044]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
3) Weights from Use Matrices (average)
NIIov 0.154*** 0.042*** 0.070 0.159***
[0.035] [0.009] [0.043] [0.045]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
4) Only new inputs imported for all years after entry
NIIov 1.148*** 0.281*** 0.520*** 1.173***
[0.310] [0.058] [0.180] [0.365]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.028 0.004 0.008 0.026
5) Net entry
NIIov 0.058*** 0.015*** 0.022 0.067***
[0.021] [0.006] [0.015] [0.023]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
6) Only first varieties
Net entry of imported inputs 0.086*** 0.030*** 0.023 0.091***
[0.021] [0.005] [0.017] [0.026]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
7) Excluding capital goods
NIIov 0.108*** 0.042*** 0.053* 0.101***
[0.030] [0.006] [0.027] [0.038]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
8) Excluding capital goods, fuels, and lubricants
NIIov 0.101*** 0.041*** 0.047* 0.092**
[0.031] [0.006] [0.025] [0.039]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
Standard errors are corrected for clustering within industries.
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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firm-specific shocks occurring in Italy. We believe this is a plausible assumption, given
that our baseline specifications include firm and year fixed effects, as well as several firm
and industry controls. Nevertheless, in what follows we show that our main results are
robust to a number alternative IV approaches, which are meant to address any potential
remaining correlation between the instrument and the error term. In particular, since
one could worry about endogeneity issues introduced by correlated demand and sup-
ply shocks across countries, we employ alternative instruments that respond to these
concerns.
In panel (1), we exclude from the computation of the instrument the arrival of new
imported inputs in France and Germany. These are the main trading partners of Italy
in Europe, leading to higher cross-country correlation in the business cycle than with
other EU members (Artis et al., 2004). This might have potential implications for the ex-
ogeneity of the instrument. The exclusion of France and Germany from the instrumen-
tal variable does not lead to any significant changes in our results. The same applies to
panel (2), where we instrument the arrival of new imported inputs in Italy focusing ex-
clusively on new imported inputs in the UK, a country whose business cycle is actually
more correlated with the US than with continental Europe, also due to the fact that the
UK never adopted the Euro as its currency (Artis et al., 2004).
In the same vein, in panel (4) we compute the instrument by considering only 10
countries of Central and Eastern Europe that entered the EU between 2004 and 2007.11
Over our period of analysis, 1995-2007, these countries witnessed a process of transi-
tion and convergence towards the rest of Europe. These economic trajectories were very
different than those of Italy: an older industrialized member of the EU. Moreover, none
of the accession countries adopted the Euro over the sample period, with the only ex-
ception of Slovenia in 2007. This very conservative choice on the construction of the
11These countries are: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia.
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instrument leads unsurprisingly to a lower F-statistic in the first stage. Even then, our
main results on wages are confirmed, while the NIIov coefficient in the second column
is positive but not statistically significant.
In panels (4) to (6), in line with Autor et al. (2013) and Colantone and Crino` (2014), we
exclude from the analysis three groups of industries for which correlated shocks across
countries are more likely to be relevant. Specifically, in panel (4) we exclude the most
cyclical industries, identified as the ones witnessing the highest correlation between
their own output growth and GDP growth in Italy over the sample.12 In panel (5), we
exclude a number of industries characterized by significant global fluctuations in the
period of analysis, as identified by Autor et al. (2013).13 Finally, in panel (5) we exclude
the most energy intensive industries, as identified by the US Department of Energy.14
Our main results are robust across the board. If anything, we tend to find a significant
positive effect of new imported inputs also on the white-collar wages. Moreover, the es-
timated coefficients tend to be larger than in the baseline regressions, which therefore
seem to provide conservative estimates of the effects of new imported inputs.
In Table 7 we augment the baseline specifications with different sets of fixed effects
capturing time trends. These are meant to absorb remaining contemporaneous shocks,
thus further raising confidence in the validity of the exclusion restriction. In particular,
following Colantone and Crino` (2014), we include in the regressions sector-year dum-
mies, where sectors are defined as groups of 2-digit industries witnessing similar dy-
namics over the sample in terms of some observable outcomes. For instance, in panel
(1) we focus on the growth in import intensity between 1995 and 2007. We measure
12These industries are: “apparel” (NACE 18); “pulp and paper” (NACE 21); “coke, petroleum products,
and nuclear fuel” (NACE 23); “non-metallic mineral products” (NACE 26); and “automotive” (NACE 34).
13These industries are: “textiles” (NACE 17); “apparel” (NACE 18); “leather” (NACE 19); “non-metallic
mineral products” (NACE 26); “basic metals” (NACE 27); and “office machinery and computers” (NACE
30).
14These industries are: “pulp and paper” (NACE 21); “coke, petroleum products, and nuclear fuel”
(NACE 23); “chemicals” (NACE 24); “non-metallic mineral products” (NACE 26); and “basic metals” (NACE
27).
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Table 6: Robustness checks: alternative instruments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ∆ wage ∆ share ∆ wage ∆ wage
All WC WC BC
1) Excluding France and Germany
NIIov 0.122*** 0.043*** 0.051 0.125***
[0.033] [0.007] [0.034] [0.040]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
First stage coefficient 0.908*** 0.908*** 0.908*** 0.908***
[0.102] [0.102] [0.102] [0.102]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 78.92 78.92 78.92 78.92
2) Focusing on UK only
NIIov 0.144*** 0.037*** 0.028 0.154***
[0.033] [0.010] [0.024] [0.036]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.026
First stage coefficient 0.827*** 0.827*** 0.827*** 0.827***
[0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 365.5 365.5 365.5 365.5
3) Focusing on 10 Central Eastern EU new Members
NIIov 0.148** 0.016 0.098 0.195**
[0.068] [0.022] [0.078] [0.082]
Obs. 225,918 225,918 225,918 225,918
R2 0.017 0.007 0.002 0.016
First stage coefficient 0.781*** 0.781*** 0.781*** 0.781***
[0.268] [0.268] [0.268] [0.268]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 8.48 8.48 8.48 8.48
4) Excluding most cyclical industries
NIIov 0.144*** 0.048*** 0.050* 0.153***
[0.031] [0.006] [0.027] [0.039]
Obs. 354,811 354,811 354,811 354,811
R2 0.03 0.004 0.009 0.027
First stage coefficient 0.958*** 0.958*** 0.958*** 0.958***
[0.076] [0.076] [0.076] [0.076]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 158.67 158.67 158.67 158.67
5) Excluding most volatile industries (Autor et al., 2013)
NIIov 0.166** 0.018 0.142** 0.200**
[0.070] [0.022] [0.060] [0.085]
Obs. 315,309 315,309 315,309 315,309
R2 0.031 0.004 0.009 0.028
First stage coefficient 0.845*** 0.845*** 0.845*** 0.845***
[0.056] [0.056] [0.056] [0.056]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 223.54 223.54 223.54 223.54
6) Excluding most energy-intensive industries
NIIov 0.143*** 0.048*** 0.054* 0.148***
[0.033] [0.006] [0.029] [0.040]
Obs. 353,453 353,453 353,453 353,453
R2 0.028 0.004 0.008 0.026
First stage coefficient 0.934*** 0.934*** 0.934*** 0.934***
[0.091] [0.091] [0.091] [0.091]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 106.07 106.07 106.07 106.07
Standard errors are corrected for clustering within industries.
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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this growth for each 2-digit industry, and then we aggregate industries in five equal-size
groups, each referring to a bin of the distribution. Each group of industries is a sector.
The regressions include the full set of interactions between the five dummies identifying
each sector and the year dummies. These interactions capture all time-varying differ-
ences across industries belonging to each sector. This implies that we identify the effect
of new imported inputs only out of remaining variation, within years, across industries
that witness similar dynamics of import competition over the sample. In panel (2), we
repeat the same exercise considering changes in export intensity. In panel (3) the focus
is on output growth, while in panels (4) and (5) the groups of similar industries are iden-
tified based on capital and material intensity growth, respectively. Overall, the idea is
that industries witnessing similar dynamics of these variables might have been exposed
to similar shocks over time. All results are in line with our baseline evidence, in terms of
magnitude and significance.
Finally, in Table 8 we allow for heterogeneous trends across industries, based on pre-
sample performance. For instance, in panel (1) we measure the growth in import in-
tensity between 1990 and 1995 –thus over five years before the beginning of the sample
period– and we interact it with year dummies. This allows for differential trajectories
over time across industries, based on their ex-ante growth in import pressure. In panel
(2), we repeat the same analysis focusing on pre-sample growth of export intensity. In
panel (3) we consider output growth, while in panels (4) and (5) we focus on capital and
material intensity, respectively. In all cases, our evidence is essentially unaffected. If
anything, also in this type of analysis we sometimes find evidence of a positive effect of
new imported inputs on white-collars wages.
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Table 7: Robustness checks: contemporaneous shocks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ∆ wage ∆ share ∆ wage ∆ wage
All WC WC BC
1) Sector-year dummies: Import intensity (1995-2007)
NIIov 0.092*** 0.026** 0.033 0.099***
[0.018] [0.013] [0.036] [0.022]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.030 0.005 0.008 0.028
First stage coefficient 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.946***
[0.077] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 151.69 151.69 151.69 151.69
2) Sector-year dummies: Export intensity (1995-2007)
NIIov 0.117*** 0.044*** 0.044 0.122***
[0.021] [0.010] [0.027] [0.028]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.030 0.005 0.008 0.028
First stage coefficient 0.942*** 0.942*** 0.942*** 0.942***
[0.060] [0.060] [0.060] [0.060]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 248.7 248.7 248.7 248.7
3) Sector-year dummies: Output (1995-2007)
NIIov 0.108*** 0.017 0.058*** 0.108***
[0.024] [0.013] [0.022] [0.029]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.032 0.005 0.009 0.03
First stage coefficient 0.884*** 0.884*** 0.884*** 0.884***
[0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 90.01 90.01 90.01 90.01
4) Sector-year dummies: Capital intensity (1995-2007)
NIIov 0.071** 0.033*** 0.045 0.073**
[0.031] [0.012] [0.039] [0.035]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.030 0.005 0.008 0.028
First stage coefficient 0.947*** 0.947*** 0.947*** 0.947***
[0.051] [0.051] [0.051] [0.051]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 339.83 339.83 339.83 339.83
5) Sector-year dummies: Material intensity (1995-2007)
NIIov 0.117*** 0.044*** 0.036 0.123***
[0.038] [0.009] [0.033] [0.046]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.030 0.005 0.008 0.028
First stage coefficient 0.905*** 0.905*** 0.905*** 0.905***
[0.086] [0.086] [0.086] [0.086]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 111.55 111.55 111.55 111.55
Standard errors are corrected for clustering within industries.
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
29
Table 8: Robustness checks: underlying trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: ∆ wage ∆ share ∆ wage ∆ wage
All WC WC BC
1) Pre-sample change in import intensity (1990-1995)
NIIov 0.121*** 0.048*** 0.040 0.125***
[0.036] [0.015] [0.040] [0.041]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.027
First stage coefficient 0.844*** 0.844*** 0.844*** 0.844***
[0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 139.74 139.74 139.74 139.74
2) Pre-sample change in export intensity (1990-1995)
NIIov 0.138*** 0.029*** 0.075** 0.149***
[0.032] [0.010] [0.031] [0.038]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.030 0.004 0.008 0.027
First stage coefficient 0.947*** 0.947*** 0.947*** 0.947***
[0.072] [0.072] [0.072] [0.072]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 174.2 174.2 174.2 174.2
3) Pre-sample output growth (1990-1995)
NIIov 0.126*** 0.042*** 0.050 0.127***
[0.027] [0.007] [0.034] [0.033]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.027
First stage coefficient 0.915*** 0.915*** 0.915*** 0.915***
[0.093] [0.093] [0.093] [0.093]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 97.58 97.58 97.58 97.58
4) Pre-sample change in capital intensity (1990-1995)
NIIov 0.140*** 0.041*** 0.067** 0.144***
[0.030] [0.007] [0.030] [0.037]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.030 0.004 0.008 0.027
First stage coefficient 0.922*** 0.922*** 0.922*** 0.922***
[0.089] [0.089] [0.089] [0.089]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 106.83 106.83 106.83 106.83
5) Pre-sample change in material intensity (1990-1995)
NIIov 0.135*** 0.042*** 0.062** 0.139***
[0.027] [0.009] [0.030] [0.034]
Obs. 415,490 415,490 415,490 415,490
R2 0.030 0.004 0.008 0.028
First stage coefficient 0.920*** 0.920*** 0.920*** 0.920***
[0.092] [0.092] [0.092] [0.092]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 98.96 98.96 98.96 98.96
Standard errors are corrected for clustering within industries.
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
30
6 Worker-level evidence
The results identified so far are consistent with different, non-mutually exclusive micro-
level adjustment dynamics. In particular, the increase in firm-level average wages for
blue collars, in response to new imported inputs, could be driven both by higher earn-
ings for continuing workers, i.e., the intensive margin, and by changes in the pool of
employed workers, i.e., the extensive margin. In this section, we start exploiting the
matched employer-employee nature of the INPS data to investigate the worker-level dy-
namics underlying our firm-level findings.
6.1 Continuing workers
We start by assessing the impact of new imported inputs on the wages of continuing
workers, i.e., those workers that remain employed at the same firm over two years after
the arrival of new imported inputs. The timing is thus fully consistent with the firm-level
analysis.
We estimate the following specification:
∆Worker Wageizjt = αiz + αt + β1NIIovjt−2 + Iit−2δ
′
+ Fzt−2γ
′
+ Sjt−2λ
′
+ εizjt, (4)
where i indexes individual workers, z firms, j industries, and t years.
∆Worker Wageizjt is the (log) wage growth of worker i between year t and t− 2. The
specification is estimated only on workers that remain employed at the same firm (z)
over the two years. This allows us to investigate the impact of new imported inputs ar-
riving in t − 2 in industry j –i.e., NIIovjt−2– on the wages of continuing workers within
each firm.
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αt andαiz are, respectively, year and worker-firm fixed effects. The inclusion of worker-
firm fixed effects implies that we identify the effect of new imported inputs on the wages
of individual workers only out of variations in their salary while they are employed within
the same firm, even across more than one job-spell over time.
Fzt−2 and Sjt−2 are the same vectors of firm and industry-specific controls, measured
at time t− 2, as described in equation 3. Iit−2 is instead a vector of worker-level controls
in t− 2. It includes: age; age squared; tenure within the firm; and tenure squared. In the
regressions where white and blue-collar workers are pooled, we also include a dummy
for white collars.
Overall, our identification strategy consists of comparing changes in individual wages
across similar workers, who are continuously employed in similar firms operating in
similar industries, except for the entry rate of new imported inputs.
Table 9 contains the results from the estimation of equation 4. The first three columns
report OLS estimates of a basic specification, which includes year and worker-firm fixed
effects, while excluding the three vectors of controls for worker, firm, and industry char-
acteristics. Column 1 refers to the whole sample of continuing workers; column 2 is
estimated only on white-collar workers; while column 3 contains estimates for the sam-
ple of blue-collar workers. In columns 3-6 we estimate the same specifications as in
columns 1-3, but instrumenting NIIovjt−2 using the arrival of new imported inputs in
other European countries. Finally, in columns 7-9 we provide IV estimates of the com-
plete specification outlined in equation 4, thus including also the three vectors of con-
trols.
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Across the board, we never find any significant effects of new imported inputs on
the wages of continuing workers. This suggests that the identified effects on firm-level
wages are more likely to be driven by the extensive rather than the intensive margin. That
is, by changes in the workforce at the firm level, rather than by changes in the wages of
continuously employed workers. We investigate the effect of new imported inputs on
worker mobility in the next sections.
6.2 Job separations
To investigate the impact of new imported inputs on job separations, we estimate re-
gressions of the following form:
Prob(Separationizjt) = αiz + αt + β1NIIovjt−2 + Iit−2δ
′
+ Fzt−2γ
′
+ Sjt−2λ
′
+ εizjt, (5)
where i indexes individual workers, z firms, j industries, and t years.
Separationizjt is a dummy equal to 1 in case worker i, who is employed at firm z in
year t − 2, stops working for firm z over the next two years. The rest of the specification
is exactly the same as in equation 4 for the analysis of continuing workers’ wages. The
main explanatory variable is always the arrival of new imported inputs in year t− 2, and
we keep controlling for time and worker-firm fixed effects, on top of including the three
vectors of worker, firm, and industry controls at t− 2.
Table 10 presents the baseline estimates of equation 5. The model is estimated sepa-
rately for blue collars (left panel) and white collars (right panel). Moreover, within each
category of workers, we further differentiate between low-wage and high-wage work-
ers. Low-wage workers in each category are the ones whose salary is below the mean
salary paid by the firm for their category, in year t − 2. Conversely, high-wage workers
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are above the mean. In each of the two panels, the first two columns refer to OLS estima-
tions, while the second two columns report IV estimates, where new imported inputs in
Italy are instrumented using the arrival of new imported inputs in other EU countries.
The results suggest that new imported inputs increase significantly the probability
of job separation for low-wage blue-collar workers, while their high-wage counterparts,
as well as white-collar workers, do not seem to be affected. For high-wage blue collars,
the coefficient on new imported inputs is actually negative and significant in the OLS re-
gression of column 2, suggesting that new imported inputs might also reduce the odds of
job separation among these workers. However, the coefficient is still negative but loses
significance in the IV estimation of column 4. In terms of magnitudes, the coefficient of
NIIov in the IV regression of column 3 indicates that a one-standard-deviation increase
in the arrival of new imported inputs (3.2 p.p.) leads to an increase in the probability
of job separation for low-wage blue collars by around 1.2 percentage points. This corre-
sponds to about 6% of their average probability of job separation (0.20).
In table 11, we assess the sensitivity of our findings to changing the definition of low-
wage workers. In particular, in panel (1) the group of low-wage workers includes only
those individuals earning less than the mean firm-level salary in each category, minus
5%. In panels (2) and (3), the threshold is lowered down to the mean salary minus 10%
and 20%, respectively. Finally, in panel (4) we adopt as a threshold the median wage for
each category of workers at the industry level. All regressions are two-stage least squares,
and they confirm the baseline IV findings of Table 10. That is, the arrival of new imported
inputs increases the probability of job separation for low-wage blue-collar workers only.
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Table 11: Separations: robustness
Dependent Variable: Prob. Separation (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Blue collar workers White collar workers
Sub-sample: Low wage High wage Low wage High wage
1) Low wage: below firm mean wage minus 5%
NIIov 0.349*** 0.033 -0.155 0.055
[0.069] [0.081] [0.120] [0.192]
Obs. 241,085 625,992 149,518 166,836
R2 0.644 0.562 0.586 0.571
2) Low wage: below firm mean wage minus 10%
NIIov 0.304** 0.063 -0.078 0.007
[0.123] [0.073] [0.141] [0.193]
Obs. 141,412 730,288 125,271 191,239
R2 0.668 0.562 0.594 0.568
3) Low wage: below firm mean wage minus 20%
NIIov 0.664** 0.078 0.014 -0.011
[0.253] [0.068] [0.210] [0.178]
Obs. 38,766 848,445 75,811 241,657
R2 0.716 0.569 0.617 0.565
4) Low wage: below industry median wage
NIIov 0.363*** 0.010 -0.001 -0.040
[0.071] [0.100] [0.112] [0.249]
Obs. 421,780 455,333 157,756 160,290
R2 0.120 0.167 0.093 0.163
Standard errors are corrected for clustering within industries.
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
Summing up, our worker-level evidence is consistent with the firm-level findings.
What seems to be emerging is the following pattern of adjustment: when new imported
inputs arrive, firms are more likely to separate from low-wage blue-collar workers. At the
same time, the job separation probability for white collars and high-wage blue collars is
not affected. This entails a compositional shift in the workforce, with relatively more
white-collar and high-wage blue-collar workers employed. At the firm level, the overall
average wage increases. This seems to be purely driven by a compositional effect, i.e. by
the growth of blue-collar average wages induced by job separations. In fact, the wages
of continuing workers, both blue and white-collars, are not significantly affected.
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7 Selection and assortative matching
To further characterize the adjustment process using matched employer-employee data,
we apply the methodology developed by Abowd et al. (1999) (AKM henceforth), which
has been applied in a large number of studies on the link between international trade
and wages (e.g., Frı´as et al., 2009, Macis and Schivardi, 2016, and Helpman et al., 2017).
The AKM methodology allows to decompose individual wages into several components,
as related to time-variant worker characteristics, as well as time-invariant firm and worker
fixed effects. The worker fixed effects are then interpreted as a proxy for individual fea-
tures that are unobservable to the econometrician. The idea is that, conditional upon
observable characteristics, higher individual wages reflect higher unobserved skills, which
are captured by higher estimated worker fixed effects. A similar reasoning applies to firm
fixed effects, for which higher values reflect better firm characteristics leading to higher
wages, ceteris paribus.
Endowed with estimated firm and worker fixed effects from the AKM estimations, we
perform two different analyses. First, we use the estimated worker fixed effects to inves-
tigate whether the arrival of new imported inputs leads to a positive selection of better
workers at the industry level. Second, we test whether new imported inputs have any
positive implications on the quality of matching between firms and workers, by which
better workers are matched to better firms. In other words, we test whether new im-
ported inputs lead to higher correlation between firm and worker fixed effects within
industries, i.e., to positive assortative matching.
We implement the AKM methodology by estimating the following specification:
ln(Wageizjt) = α + Xitδ
′
+ αi + αz + αj + αt + Zitγ
′
+ εizjt, (6)
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where i indexes individual workers, z firms, j industries, and t years.
Xit is a set of individual time-variant worker characteristics. It includes: age, age
squared, tenure within the firm, tenure squared, and a dummy for white collars. αi and
αz are worker and firm fixed effects, respectively. αj are 2-digit industry fixed effects, and
αt are year fixed effects. Finally, Zit is a vector of interactions between all the explanatory
variables and a dummy for females, as in Macis and Schivardi (2016).15
Importantly, equation 6 is estimated only on the group of connected observations,
i.e., workers and firms that are connected by some events of job switching. Indeed, as
discussed by Abowd et al. (2002), it is only within a connected group that worker and firm
effects can be properly identified. The estimation group in our case contains 1,689,293
observations, which account for around 68% of the total sample of worker-level obser-
vations. The AKM methodology rests on the assumption of exogenous worker mobil-
ity, conditional on observables as well as on firm and worker fixed effects. Specifically,
worker mobility should be independent of time-specific firm-level shocks, worker-firm
match effects, and transitory wage shocks. In Appendix B we present a number of tests
of this assumption, building on earlier work by Card et al. (2013), Card et al. (2015), and
Macis and Schivardi (2016). Reassuringly, we find the mobility characteristics of our
sample to be in line with the AKM assumption of exogenous mobility.
Table 12 reports estimation results for the first of the two analyses based on AKM es-
timates. The dependent variable is the average worker fixed effect, computed separately
for each 2-digit industry and year. This is regressed over the baseline variable capturing
the overall arrival of new imported inputs (NIIov) in year t− 2, controlling for year fixed
effects. The first three columns refer to OLS estimations, while columns 3 to 6 report
15The tenure data are censored because we do not have information on workers prior to 1995. To ac-
count for this censoring, we follow the same strategy employed by Macis and Schivardi (2016). In partic-
ular, for all the interested workers, we compute tenure as if they entered the firm in 1995, and we then
interact this tenure variable with dummy variables indicating their age group in 1995. These interactions
allow for different trajectories across different age groups. The groups are defined as follows: 16-24; 25-34;
35-44; 45-54; and 55-64.
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IV estimates, where the baseline instrument is employed. Within each group of regres-
sions, in the first column the average worker effect is evaluated over the pooled sample
of blue and white-collar workers, while the second and third columns, respectively, refer
separately to white and blue-collar workers.
We find evidence of a positive effect of new imported inputs on the average skills
of workers employed in each industry. This finding seems to be driven by a positive
selection effect on blue-collar workers, while there is no significant impact of new im-
ported inputs on the average skills of white collars. These results are fully in line with
our findings on wages and job separations. In particular, the arrival of new imported
inputs seems to determine not only more job separations among low-wage blue-collar
workers, but also an overall improvement in the average unobserved skills of employed
blue-collar workers at the industry level. The magnitude of the effect is not negligible:
the IV coefficient of column 6 implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in NIIov
(0.032) leads to an increase in the average unobserved skills of blue collars by about 0.06,
which corresponds to around 30% of the standard deviation.
Finally, in Table 13 we assess the impact of new imported inputs on the quality of
matching between firms and workers. The structure of the table is the same as in Ta-
ble 12. The dependent variable is the correlation between firm and worker fixed effects,
computed separately for each industry and year. The results suggest that the arrival of
new imported inputs has a significant effect on the extent of positive assortative match-
ing at the industry level. Also in this case, the effect seems to be driven by blue-collar
workers, while there is no significant impact on white collars. In particular, according
to the IV coefficient of column 6, a one-standard-deviation increase in NIIov (0.032)
leads to an improvement in assortative matching by about 0.08, which corresponds to
around 56% of the standard deviation. By and large, this evidence is in line with the other
findings, and points to a further important effect of new imported inputs in terms of im-
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proved allocative efficiency. Our findings are also complementary to recent results by
Bombardini et al. (2015), who find a positive effect of exporting on worker-firm match-
ing in France.
Table 12: Worker heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Mean Worker Fixed Effects
Sample: All White Blue All White Blue
Workers Collar Collar Workers Collar Collar
NIIov 4.008*** 0.187 4.178*** 1.672* -0.873 1.728*
[0.765] [0.870] [0.791] [0.950] [0.685] [0.985]
Estimator OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 286 286 286 286 286 286
R2 0.508 0.412 0.519 0.448 0.395 0.459
First-stage results
New Imported Inputs EU - - - 0.815*** 0.815*** 0.815***
- - - [0.045] [0.045] [0.045]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic - - - 324.00 324.00 324.00
Standard errors are corrected for clustering within industries.
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 13: Assortative matching
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Assortative Matching
Sample: All White Blue All White Blue
Workers Collar Collar Workers Collar Collar
NIIov 3.844*** 0.862 4.221*** 2.299*** 0.610 2.468***
[0.603] [1.527] [0.633] [0.740] [1.210] [0.854]
Estimator OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 286 283 286 286 283 286
R2 0.329 0.064 0.320 0.280 0.064 0.268
First-stage results
New Imported Inputs EU - - - 0.815*** 0.790*** 0.815***
- - - [0.045] [0.045] [0.045]
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic - - - 324.00 313.64 324.00
Standard errors are corrected for clustering within industries.
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
8 Discussion and possible channels
Our empirical evidence depicts a situation of industry transformation. The arrival of
new imported inputs leads to a compositional change in the workforce, with a higher
share of white-collar workers employed, and a selection of the higher wage, and higher
skilled, blue-collar workers. The quality of matching between firms and workers also
tends to improve in industries witnessing higher entry of new imported inputs.
The effects we identify are consistent with several findings of earlier literature on the
impact of imported inputs. In particular, Colantone and Crino` (2014) show that new im-
ported inputs lead to higher entry of new domestic products in the importing countries.
This effect is driven by two channels, as domestic producers benefit from both wider and
better sets of intermediate inputs, evaluated in terms of price-quality ratios. Moreover,
Colantone and Crino` (2014) also find that the newly introduced domestic products tend
to be upgraded as compared to previously produced goods. In particular, new products
sell on average at a higher price, and are characterized by higher quality, as inferred from
a market share premium conditional on prices (as in Khandelwal et al., 2013). To the
42
extent that the introduction of new upgraded products requires relatively higher skills,
product entry could be one channel driving our findings.
In Table 14 we provide some suggestive evidence along these lines. In particular, we
replicate the baseline firm-level analysis as in columns 9-12 of Table 3 on two separate
groups of industries, characterized by high vs. low entry rates of new domestic products.
More specifically, an industry is classified in the first group if the cumulated entry rate of
new domestic products, over the sample period, is above the median. Conversely, indus-
tries in the second group are below the median. The yearly entry rate of new domestic
products in each industry is computed based on Eurostat-PRODCOM data as explained
in Section 5.3, in line with Colantone and Crino` (2014).
The results in the left panel of Table 14 refer to firms operating in industries charac-
terized by relatively high entry of new products. The findings are in line with the baseline
evidence of Table 3. That is, new imported inputs lead to an increase in average wages
at the firm level. This is driven by an increase in the share of white collars, and by higher
growth in the average wage of blue-collar workers. Instead, for the less innovative in-
dustries, in the right panel, the coefficients of NIIov are positive but not statistically
different from zero. Overall, this evidence suggests that our general results on the effects
of new imported inputs might be driven especially by firms active in industries witness-
ing more product entry over the sample. This is line with a positive role of new imported
inputs in determining higher product innovation, which entails an upgrade of the work-
force.
Earlier literature has also shown that imported inputs induce productivity gains and
improvements in export performance, which might also go hand-in-hand with an up-
grade of the workforce (Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2014, and Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2015).
In line with this, in Table 15 we perform an analysis similar to the one in Table 14, but
splitting industries according to their average export intensity over the sample period:
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above the median in the left panel; below the median in the right panel. Also in this case,
we obtain suggestive evidence that the general effects of new imported inputs are driven
in particular by firms operating in industries that are more active in terms of exports.
To conclude, our evidence seems to suggest that new imported inputs matter espe-
cially in the most dynamic industries, which innovate and export relatively more, adjust-
ing their workforce consistently.
Table 14: Heterogeneity: new products
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High Entry of New Products Low Entry of New Products
Dependent Variable: ∆ wage ∆ share ∆ wage ∆ wage ∆ wage ∆ share ∆ wage ∆ wage
All WC WC BC All WC WC BC
NIIov 0.143*** 0.044*** 0.028 0.149*** 0.104 0.045 0.084 0.105
[0.046] [0.009] [0.032] [0.055] [0.105] [0.031] [0.096] [0.127]
Estimator 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 208,085 208,085 208,085 208,085 207,405 207,405 207,405 207,405
R2 0.03 0.005 0.009 0.027 0.029 0.004 0.008 0.027
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 422.1 422.1 422.1 422.1 33.51 33.51 33.51 33.51
Standard errors are corrected for clustering within industries.
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 15: Heterogeneity: export intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High Export Intensity Low Export Intensity
Dependent Variable: ∆ wage ∆ share ∆ wage ∆ wage ∆ wage ∆ share ∆ wage ∆ wage
All WC WC BC All WC WC BC
NIIov 0.142*** 0.042*** 0.051 0.140*** 0.072 0.032 0.072 0.105
[0.033] [0.007] [0.043] [0.038] [0.078] [0.023] [0.045] [0.095]
Estimator 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Firm controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Obs. 196,035 196,035 196,035 196,035 219,455 219,455 219,455 219,455
R2 0.028 0.004 0.008 0.026 0.033 0.005 0.008 0.03
Kleibergen-Paap F-Statistic 102.8 102.8 102.8 102.8 219.7 219.7 219.7 219.7
Standard errors are corrected for clustering within industries.
***, **, * = indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
9 Conclusion
We have studied the effects of new imported inputs on wages and worker mobility, us-
ing a matched employer-employee dataset on the Italian manufacturing sector, between
1995 and 2007. This dataset has been linked to industry-level data on the arrival of new
imported inputs, identified at the disaggregated 8-digit product level. Our results show
that new imported inputs have a positive effect on average wage growth at the firm level.
This positive effect is driven by two factors: (1) an increase in the white-collar/blue-
collar ratio; and (2) an increase in wage growth for blue-collar workers. When perform-
ing the analysis at the individual level, we find that the increase in blue-collar wages is
determined by the displacement of the lowest paid workers. Instead, we find no signifi-
cant effects of new imported inputs on the wages of continuously employed individuals,
irrespectively of their category.
We have employed the methodology by Abowd et al. (1999) to estimate worker and
firm fixed effects in wage regressions. Endowed with these estimates, we have found that
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new imported inputs have a positive effect on the average unobserved skills of employed
workers, as inferred from higher worker fixed effects. Moreover, we have provided evi-
dence that new imported inputs have a positive impact on the correlation between firm
and worker fixed effects, that is, on the extent of positive assortative matching at the
industry level. Consistent with the findings on job separations, these effects on worker
selection and allocative efficiency seem to be mostly driven by blue-collar workers.
Overall, our results depict a situation of industry transformation as a result of global
sourcing opportunities. The evidence we provide is in line with earlier studies in the
literature, which have shown how imported inputs have a positive effect on product in-
novation and export performance (Colantone and Crino`, 2014, Bas and Strauss-Kahn,
2014, and Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2015). In particular, we provide suggestive evidence
that our general results are mostly driven by firms operating in the most dynamic in-
dustries, characterized by more product innovation and better export performance: two
features that are consistent with the upgrade of the workforce uncovered by our findings.
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Appendix
A Data
Table A1: Data Availability
Production data Trade data Import matrices Use matrices
Austria 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995, 2000, 2005 1995, 1997, 1999-2006
Belgium-Luxemburg 1995-2007 1988-2007 1995, 2000, 2005 1995, 1997, 1999-2005
Bulgaria 2001-2007 1999-2007 - 2000-2004
Czech Republic 2001-2007 1999-2007 2005 1995-2007
Denmark 1995-2007 1988-2007 1995, 2000-2006 1995-2006
Estonia 2000-2007 1999-2007 1997, 2000, 2005 1997, 2000-2006
Finland 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995-2007
Germany 1995-2007 1988-2007 1995, 2000-2006 1995, 1997-2006
France 1995-2007 1988-2007 1995, 1997, 1999-2006 1995, 1997-2006
Greece 1995-2007 1988-2007 2000, 2005 2000-2008
Hungary 2001-2007 1999-2007 1998, 2000, 2005 1998-2006
Ireland 1995-2007 1988-2007 1998, 2000, 2005 1998, 2000-2006
Italy 1995-2007 1988-2007 1995, 2000, 2005 1995-2006
Latvia 2001-2007 1999-2007 1996, 1998 1996, 1998, 2004
Lithuania 2000-2007 1999-2007 2000, 2005 2000-2006
Netherlands 1995-2007 1988-2007 1995-2002, 2004-2006 1995-2006
Poland 2002-2007 1999-2007 2000, 2005 2000-2005
Portugal 1995-2007 1988-2007 1995, 1999, 2005 1995-2006
Romania 2000-2007 1999-2007 2000, 2003-2006 2000, 2003-2006
Slovakia 1998-2007 1999-2007 2000, 2005 1995-2006
Slovenia 2001-2007 1999-2007 1996, 2000, 2001, 2005 1996, 2000-2006
Spain 1995-2007 1988-2007 1995, 2000, 2005 1995-2006
Sweden 1995-2007 1995-2007 1995, 2000, 2005 1995-2006
United Kingdom 1995-2007 1988-2007 1995 1995-2003
B AKM: tests of the exogenous mobility assumption
The estimation methodology by Abowd et al. (1999) rests on the assumption of exoge-
nous worker mobility, conditional on observables as well as on firm and worker fixed
effects. In this section, we provide supportive evidence for this hypothesis, following
earlier work by Card et al. (2013), Card et al. (2015), and Macis and Schivardi (2016).
One possible concern is that worker mobility might be correlated with worker-firm
match specific effects. That is, workers would move away from firms where the match
effect is small, to join firms where the match effect is larger. To address this issue, we
need to investigate whether there is a sorting of workers based on their match fixed
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Table A2: Low-income countries
Afghanistan Ethiopia Moldova
Albania Gambia Mozambique
Angola Georgia Nepal
Armenia Ghana Niger
Azerbaijan Guinea Pakistan
Bangladesh Guinea Bissau Rwanda
Benin Guyana Samoa
Bhutan Haiti Sao Tome
Burkina Faso India Sierra Leone
Burundi Kenya Somalia
Cambodia Lao PDR Sri Lanka
Central African Rep. Lesotho St. Vincent
Chad Madagascar Sudan
China Malawi Togo
Comoros Maldives Uganda
Congo Mali Vietnam
Equatorial Guinea Mauritania Yemen
Eritrea
effects. We accomplish this task by studying the wage changes of job movers. Under
the assumption of exogenous mobility, workers moving from a high-firm-effect job to a
low-firm-effect job should experience a wage loss, while workers moving in the oppo-
site direction should experience a wage increase. Moreover, the wage loss of the first
group of workers should be approximately symmetrical to the wage gain of the second
group. Instead, workers moving across firms with similar fixed effects should not display
significant wage changes.
In line with Macis and Schivardi (2016), in Table A3 we split firms into quartiles based
on their fixed effects, and we assign switching workers to 16 different cells: one for each
combination of origin-firm and destination-firm quartiles. We then compute the work-
ers’ average (log) wage in each cell for each year, and the overall wage change between
2 years before the job switch and 2 years after it. The evidence supports the exogenous
mobility assumption: average wages increase for workers that move from a lower to a
higher fixed-effect quartile –monotonically with respect to the gap in quartiles– while
they decrease for switchers in the opposite direction. In particular, considering the
movement from the first to the fourth quartile, the average wage increase is around 8%,
very close in absolute terms to the wage loss for switchers in the opposite direction (-
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Table A3: Wage dynamics
Origin/ Mean log Wage of Movers Changes from 2 years before
Destination Quartile N. Of obs. 2 years before 1 year before 1 year after 2 years after to 2 years after
1 to 1 4927 5.84 5.86 5.88 5.90 0.01
1 to 2 1542 5.89 5.91 6.08 6.11 0.04
1 to 3 759 5.83 5.86 6.15 6.20 0.06
1 to 4 384 5.81 5.84 6.24 6.32 0.08
2 to 1 1288 5.97 5.98 5.88 5.87 -0.02
2 to 2 3939 6.08 6.06 6.11 6.12 0.01
2 to 3 2374 6.12 6.14 6.21 6.24 0.02
2 to 4 700 6.04 6.09 6.30 6.36 0.05
3 to 1 496 6.02 6.05 5.82 5.80 -0.04
3 to 2 1370 6.04 6.06 6.03 6.03 0.00
3 to 3 3778 6.17 6.18 6.22 6.23 0.01
3 to 4 1844 6.18 6.20 6.30 6.35 0.03
4 to 1 260 6.17 6.22 5.81 5.75 -0.07
4 to 2 486 6.13 6.17 5.96 5.94 -0.03
4 to 3 1161 6.13 6.16 6.09 6.09 -0.01
4 to 4 5174 6.23 6.25 6.29 6.30 0.01
7%). Instead, wage changes for workers that move from one firm to another within the
same quartile are negligible. These patterns are also visualized in Figures 1 and 2. By and
large, the mobility of workers does not seem to be systematically driven by worker-firm
match effects.
Figure 1: Movers from the 1st and 4th quartiles
5.60
5.70
5.80
5.90
6.00
6.10
6.20
6.30
6.40
‐2 ‐1 0 1
Me
an
 log
 W
age
 of
 M
ove
rs
Time (=0 first year in new firm)
1 to 1
1 to 2
1 to 3
1 to 4
4 to 1
4 to 2
4 to 3
4 to 4
52
Figure 2: Movers within the same quartile
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To provide additional corroborating evidence on this point, we have augmented the
baseline AKM econometric specification by including worker-firm match effects. If such
effects were relevant, we should have observed a sizable improvement in statistical fit. As
a matter of fact, though, we only observed very small changes. Specifically, the adjusted
R-squared grew from 0.87 to 0.88, while the Root MSE grew from 0.14 to 0.15. These
results further reassure us on the validity of the exogenous mobility assumption with
respect to worker-firm match effects.
A second possible concern is that worker mobility is correlated with time-specific
firm-wide shocks. That is, workers would move away from firms that are experiencing
bad shocks to join firms that are experiencing good shocks. Card et al. (2015) argue
that, if that is the case, then we should observe a wage drop for workers just before they
change firms. Reassuringly, Figure 1 shows no evidence of such a pattern. If anything,
workers experience on average negligible wage increases before switching: between t-2
and t-1.
A third source of violation for the exogenous mobility assumption is related to transi-
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tory wage shocks. Specifically, workers who displayed good performance would be more
likely to move to high-wage firms, while under-performing workers would move to low-
wage firms. Again, Figure 1 does not show any evidence of such a pattern, as negligible
increases in wages before the move are observed in all cases, regardless of the specific
transition that takes place.
Finally, in Figure 3 we show the average residuals from the AKM estimations across
100 cells, formed by the combination of the deciles of firm and worker fixed effects. This
is meant to check for the existence of any systematic patterns in the distribution of resid-
uals across worker-firm matches. Residuals tend to be very small (lower than 0.005), with
some larger values appearing only for the lowest-deciles of worker and firm fixed effects.
Overall, the evidence presented in this section is in line with earlier results by Card
et al. (2013), Card et al. (2015), and Macis and Schivardi (2016), and points to the valid-
ity of the exogenous mobility assumption. Hence, the results of Section 7 appear to be
based on reliable estimates of the unobserved worker and firm components of wages.
Figure 3: Distribution of residuals
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